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Abstract
This paper looks for evidence that either a NASCAR track or NASCAR-sanctioned event
influences the monthly rents on residential units. Data cover individual housing units in more
than 140 SMSAs over the period spanning from 1993 until 2005. During this period, several new
tracks opened, while some other tracks closed, and numerous races changed venues. These
changes enable us to identify the capitalization of costs and benefits to a community from the
presence of NASCAR tracks and events into rental values. The evidence is mixed, varying with
the treatment of housing units located in or out of central cities of SMSAs, as well as the manner
in which missing housing and community characteristics are treated in the analysis. The results
are reasonably clear that presence of a track by itself has little effect, especially on housing units
outside the central city of an SMSA. Specific types of races largely appear to have no impact,
though in some specifications, the central city and non-central city impacts are about equal but
have opposite signs. In these cases, the indication is that the NASCAR events affect non-central
city rents, but not those in the central city. Overall, we must conclude that our results reject
NASCAR as a source of either large benefits or costs to residents of the host community.
JEL Classification Codes: L83
Keywords: tourism, economic impact, special events, NASCAR, auto racing
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When the National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing (NASCAR) began in 1948, it 
organized a sport based almost entirely in the Southeastern United States.  Some of the first 
tracks on which NASCAR competed were in North and South Carolina, Alabama, Georgia, and 
Florida.  Almost fifty years later, NASCAR had seen little change in its relatively small fan base, 
and began to search for ways to gain mass appeal. 
One of the most successful endeavors used by NASCAR to expand its fan base during the 
mid- and late-1990s was the introduction of additional race tracks in some large metropolitan 
areas, including those in Homestead, Florida; Las Vegas, Nevada; and Fort Worth, Texas.  Each 
of  these  tracks  was  originally  constructed  by  individual  investors  who  sought  a  NASCAR-
sanctioned event.  Because of the amount of money that is made by the owners of existing tracks, 
corporations all over the country petition NASCAR to bring a top-tier Cup Series race to their 
area.    Even  in  light  of  these  facts,  track  construction  has  still  been  largely  abandoned  by 
NASCAR in the past five years.  Two of the most recent attempts to construct a new track were 
those outside of Seattle, Washington and on Staten Island, New York.  There has also been talk 
of building a track outside of Denver, Colorado. 
Like  all  large  building  projects,  race  track  construction  faces  opposition  from  local 
residents.  There is a growing number of people convinced that the only things an automobile 
race track brings to an area are event-day traffic, and the unpleasant roar of 30,000+ horsepower.  
Proponents of new tracks, however, point to economic welfare as a reason to build.  They argue 
that a race track would boost the local economy by providing jobs and introducing new tourist 
revenues.  The question for policymakers becomes, “Do automobile race tracks really generate 
enough local economic welfare to justify their publicly-funded construction?”  This paper seeks 
to answer that question. The nature of NASCAR events also allows us to separately address two issues related to 
sports-led development.  First, NASCAR-sanctioned tracks hold only a small number of races, 
each  of  which  could  be  likened  to  mega-events.    For  example,  the  Daytona  International 
Speedway, one of the most well-known NASCAR tracks, holds only two events each year in the 
Cup  Series,  the  most  prominent  division  in  NASCAR,  and  only  five  total  in  the  top  three 
NASCAR Series (Cup, Grand National,  and Truck).  Other tracks hold even fewer of these 
events,  with  many  holding  no  races  in  the  Cup  Series.    This  is  quite  different  from  other 
professional sports in which each stadium or arena has the same fairly large number of regularly 
scheduled contests each year, making it impossible to isolate the impact of the games from the 
ongoing activities at the facility.  Consequently, NASCAR races can be treated analogously to 
the Super Bowl or the March Madness tournament, as they attract a large number of visitors for a 
short period of time.
1 
At the same time, the tracks are also used for other  activities.  For  instance, Daytona 
hosts Daytona “Bike Week” in the early spring and “Biketoberfest” in the fall. Bike Week is 
touted  as  “The  World’s  Largest  Motorcycle  Event,”  and  attracts  thousands  of  motorcycle 
enthusiasts  annually.  Tracks  also  hold  lesser  racing  events  and  are  small  tourist  attractions 
throughout the year.  These ongoing activities contribute to the local economy as well.  The 
NASCAR situation allows us to assess the impact from the routine activities at the track, as well 
as the impact of the special activities.  In other words, the day-to-day business of the track may 
contribute to  the local  economy while the racing  mega-events  do not,  the mega-events  may 
contribute  while the typical  activities do  not,  or both  or neither may  contribute to  the local 
economy. 
                                                 
1 Attendees at Cup Series events and the Super Bowl/March Madness do not necessarily travel similar distances or 
in the same mode.  Our point is merely that both races and championship football games or basketball tournaments 
are likely to attract a substantial number of visitors to a community for only a few days out of the year. The results consistently indicate the joint statistical significance of the track and event 
variables.  Statistical significance of the individual coefficients is sensitive to specification and 
sample.  For example, the presence of a track is sometimes found to be statistically significant 
independent of the events held there, while Grand National Series races are rarely statistically 
significant  in  our  analysis.    Our  measure  of  economic  benefit  is  rents  on  residences  in  the 
standard metropolitan statistical area (SMSA) in which a track exists.  In this fashion, we follow 
the approach of Carlino and Coulson (2004).  We use a variety of housing and neighborhood 
characteristics to explain the rents, and the sample for the analysis is sensitive to the inclusion of 
some of these variables.  The qualitative results, however, are generally not sensitive to the 
sample under analysis.   
Carlino and Coulson (2004) perform their analysis on a central city sub-sample as well as 
the entire SMSA.  We address this split of the sample in two ways, first by interacting the race 
and track variables with a dummy variable indicating whether or not the observation lies within 
the central city, and second, by estimating the model separately on the central city and non-
central city observations.  In the former, the variables are almost always jointly significant, while 
several are individually significant.  When separating the observations, there is evidence that 
events  affect  the  rents  of  non-central  city  units  but  not  those  of  central  city  units.    If  the 
estimation  is  done  on  the  central  city  observations  alone,  the  track  and  event  variables  are 
sometimes jointly significant but few are individually significant.  By contrast, when using the 
non-central city observations, the variables are rarely even jointly significant. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, the literature on 
the economic benefits of automobile race tracks and other sporting venues will be reviewed.  
Immediately  following,  the methodology  and  data to  be used in  this  project  to  measure the benefits of a race track will be described.  The results are presented, followed by a discussion of 




It is important to remember that the decisions to undertake projects of such magnitudes as 
automobile race tracks require the support of the people living in the surrounding area.  Articles 
in the general news and in the business press are usually based on consultancy reports, to which 
we do not have access.  Therefore, we describe the reports in the popular press to get a sense of 
the impact analyses done by consultants.  Only after looking at the popular press will we turn our 
attention to the academic literature. 
The economic impact of race tracks varies dramatically from track to track, and is often 
reported in different manners.  For example, before Kansas Speedway opened in Wyandotte 
County in October 2002, the Gloucester County Times of New Jersey noted one prediction that 
the track itself would generate $170 million in tourism dollars, while an adjacent shopping and 
entertainment district (built at the same time as the track) would reach annual sales of $420 
million.  The Snohomish County Herald of Washington reported that, during the first year of 
operation, Kansas state officials claimed that Kansas Speedway generated $300 million for the 
state economy.  The Herald also reported that in 1999, Phoenix International Raceway generated 
over $270 million for the Arizona state economy, including $124 million in out-of-state visitor 
spending.  When a second Cup race was added in 2005, the Business Journal of Phoenix reported 
the expectation of an additional economic impact of between $175 and $200 million.  On a larger 
scale, North East Business Today reported the estimated value of the North Carolina statewide 
motorsports industry to be between $1.5 and $2 billion per year. The Snohomish County Herald reported that Daytona International Speedway, perhaps 
the most famous automobile race track in the world, has an estimated $1.8 billion economic 
impact on central Florida, with $850 million of that impact staying in Volusia County.  The 
Gloucester County Times reported that Lowe’s Motor Speedway in Concord, North Carolina 
brings in more than $275 million in the tri-county area, including $88 million in off-site spending.  
Atlanta Motor Speedway, the sister track to Lowe’s, is expected to generate revenues of $2.275 
billion over the next five years, with this amount being more than double the combined expected 
revenues  of  the  Braves,  Hawks,  and  Falcons.  One  of  the  newer  tracks  on  the Cup  circuit, 
California Speedway, brings in $136 million over the weekend when the NASCAR racers come 
to town.  Racingone.com reported that during the 2004 championship weekend (for the Truck, 
Grand National, and Cup Series), Homestead-Miami Speedway injected $146 million into the 
South Florida economy.  The Gloucester County Times reported that Watkins Glen International, 
one of the two challenging road courses on the Cup Series schedule, had a total economic impact 
of $176 million in only the three surrounding counties in 1998.  It was also reported that the 
track creates more than 2,000 jobs, and $11 million in annual state and local taxes.  A former 
public relations director at Lowe’s Motor Speedway uses a personal anecdote to summarize race 
fan spending.  Once, at a rest stop near Daytona, a waitress said that most of the people she 
serves visit the race track with at least $1,000 in their pockets and intend to go home with zero. 
Predictions by the Seattle Sports Commission (as reported by the Snohomish County 
Herald) indicated that the proposed track in Kitsap County, Washington would hold 70,000 to 
80,000 people, and bring in $87 million in yearly revenue, as well as another $58 million in state 
and local taxes.  The formal analysis done by Berk & Associates estimated annual statewide 
economic benefits of $139.5 million, as well as an additional $492 million of positive economic 
impact during the construction phase.  Once open, the track was projected to create 2,350 new jobs, of which only 50 would be year-round at the track, generating $49.15 million in additional 
wages, while during the construction phase there would be employment of 5,900 people for a 
total of $180 million in wages.  More recent information provided by the Associated Press in 
Olympia, Washington placed the cost of the new track at $386 million, of which the International 
Speedway Corporation (ISC, the publicly-traded sister company of NASCAR) would pay at least 
$180 million (plus any cost overruns), leaving the State of Washington to pay the balance.  Lt. 
Governor Brad Owen and Representative Geoff Simpson, the main legislative supporters of the 
project, assured Washington voters that bond sales (to be repaid by sales and admission taxes 
generated by the facility) would repay the state share, and that no new taxes would be imposed.  
They also claimed that the track would boost the state economy by almost $4 billion over the 
next 30 years (though they pointed out that at the same time, predicted employment during the 
construction phase was lowered to about 5,600 people). 
The reported facts are not all in favor of constructing tracks, however.  Should a new 
track be built in the Puget Sound region of the northwest, it could force local Saturday-night 
short  tracks  out  of  business.    The  Snohomish  County  Herald  reported  that  at  Evergreen 
Speedway, located near the 500-acre site of the proposed Kitsap County track, management was 
worried that the introduction of well-funded competition could wipe out its operation, especially 
if lighting was included to allow the new track to function at night. 
The Olympian of Washington reported that elsewhere, while the Chicagoland Speedway 
has developed in Joliet, Illinois, the surrounding area has not.  Four years after the track opened, 
commercial businesses were just beginning to enter into negotiations to develop the vacant land 
surrounding  the  track.    As  for  specific  figures  related  to  the  economic  impact  of  the  track, 
research has not yet been conducted by management.  It is often said that the biggest gainers in Illinois on race weekends are the nearby farmers, who rent out their land as parking lots for 
motor homes. 
Although there were claims, as reported by the Associated Press in Olympia, Washington, 
that more than 300 businesses in the Kitsap County region supported building a track nearby, 
county polls in September 2006 indicated only 54 percent of people in Kitsap, Mason, and Pierce 
Counties were in favor of its construction.  Finally, in April 2007, the ISC abandoned the project 
in  Washington.    Although  past  and  present  Cup  Series  drivers  attempted  to  persuade  state 
legislators of the economic benefits of a race track, lawmakers such as House Speaker Frank 
Chopp and Senate Majority Leader Lisa Brown felt as though the funding of education and 
health care was a more pressing issue. 
Support seems to be lacking for the ISC in other locations as well.  In early December 
2006, the Associated Press of Charlotte, North Carolina reported that the company was forced to 
cancel its plans to build a 0.8-mile short track on Staten Island, New York.  After spending over 
$120 million for over 670 acres of land, and millions in land improvements and developments, 
lack of political support forced the company to abandon the project.  New York City Council 
Minority Leader James S. Oddo called the outcome a “monumental victory for the people of 
Staten Island.”  This came less than a year after an April public meeting on the subject was 
stopped by police because of safety concerns, after tempers flared over would-be traffic tie-ups, 
road renovation to handle increased traffic volume, and environmental consequences.  The Staten 
Island Advance reported that the developer estimated an additional $550 to  $600 million  in 
spending, beyond the cost of land and improvements, was required to complete the project. 
As is well-known in the academic literature on other sports venues, there are reasons to 
be skeptical of the economic impact analysis implying large benefits from automobile race tracks.  
For  example,  some  of  the  reported  employment  numbers  seem  excessive  to  operate  tracks, especially if the jobs are full-time.  In the previously mentioned estimate of economic impact 
pertaining to Watkins Glen International, it was noted that this track generated 2,000 jobs.  In 
NASCAR, most employees at a track on race day are either employed by NASCAR itself (car 
inspectors, pit officials, etc.), the broadcasting company (commentators, camera and production 
crews, etc.), or the race teams  (drivers,  crews,  etc.), all of which leave the area afterwards.  
Safety crews and ushers are mostly local volunteers, and security and traffic control are provided 
by state and local police.  In other words, many of those who are paid to work at the races have 
jobs anyway, which are not specific to the track.  The track itself would employ mostly ticket 
punchers and general merchandise vendors.  All race teams operate their own souvenir trailers 
that leave after the race is over.  Therefore, the reported 2,000 jobs is likely to include many 
more part-time than full-time employees, meaning a smaller economic impact.  Evidence of this 
can be seen in the Berk & Associates analysis of the proposed track in Kitsap County, which 
noted that only 50 of the 2,350 jobs created would be full-time.  In other words, estimates of 
impact are likely to be overstated. 
The academic literature has not addressed the general impact of NASCAR.  Instead, the 
focus has been on the economic impact of a single automobile race.  Baade and Matheson (2000) 
concentrate on the Daytona 500, and find that in February, the month during which the Great 
American Race is run, taxable sales in Volusia County and those adjacent to it increase just over 
$40 million.  They suggest that this is likely to be an overestimation of the economic impact of 
the race.  Of course, Baade and Matheson’s finding is a far cry from both the $1.8 billion impact 
on Central Florida and the $850 million impact on Volusia County that the Snohomish County 
Herald reported.  This vast difference suggests that policymakers should be wary of predicted 
economic impacts in the hundreds of millions of dollars range, especially since proposed tracks 
will never hold a race nearly as prestigious as the Daytona 500. It is possible to compare the economic impact of the Daytona 500 to other sporting mega-
events.  For example, Matheson and Baade (2005) venture a best guess of a $6.8 million impact 
for a single Major League Baseball (MLB) post-season game.  This translates to just under $75 
million in total host community impact, assuming that a team appears in all 19 games possible 
for the championship (only 11 of which would be at home, assuming home-field advantage 
throughout).  This is at the low end of the $50 to $250 million range that is often quoted by local 
officials  when  announcing the  economic impact of a post-season  appearance  by  a would-be 
championship team.  Keeping with baseball, Baade and Matheson (2001) find questionable the 
studies conducted by Major League Baseball that estimate the economic impact of its All-Star 
Games to be at $60 million.  Their results show that taxable sales actually fall $30 million below 
pre-All-Star  Game  levels  in  host  cities,  and  that  employment  also  falls  by  over  8,000  jobs.   
Regarding  the  National  Football  League  (NFL),  Matheson  and  Baade  (2004)  find  that  the 
average economic impact of the Super Bowl to be $92 million, which conflicts with NFL claims 
that Super Bowl XXXIII had a $393 million impact on South Florida.  Looking at Houston, 
Texas, the host city for both the 2004 NFL Super Bowl and MLB All-Star Game, Coates (2006) 
finds that while the Super Bowl did significantly increase sales tax revenues, neither it nor the 
MLB  All-Star  Game  generated  large  economic  boosts.    The  National  Collegiate  Athletics 
Association (NCAA) basketball tournament is one of the collegiate mega-events.  Just looking at 
the impact of the Final Four for Men, Matheson and Baade (2003) estimate the probability of 
realizing the claimed $100 million economic benefit to the hosting city is only slightly higher 
than five percent.  On the other hand, there is a 20 percent probability that the Final Four for 
Women will have a local economic impact of at least $100 million, indicating that cities that 
desire to host a Final Four should concentrate on getting the women’s games and pass on those 
of the men.  The empirical analysis of other sporting mega-events seems to  yield economic impacts comparable to the Daytona 500.  As with this event, the popular claims of other mega-
event benefits also far exceed those calculated by independent analysts. 
While the econometric literature contains only one analysis of a single-race weekend, it 
does not address at all the fact that automobile race tracks do not operate for only one or two 
weekends per year.  The most publicized races are those of the NASCAR Cup Series, but there 
are events held by other racing series as well.  In 2007, the Indy Racing League will race on nine 
of the same tracks as the Cup Series drivers.  A vast number of lesser known racing series and 
car models race on these tracks as well.  In between races, tracks also hold test dates, during 
which teams get a head start on preparing for future races.  There are also tire testing dates, 
where teams are chosen by tire manufacturers to see if tires can survive the chassis setups the 
cars are running.  In NASCAR, in particular, tire testing has become very important, since at the 
Fall 2005 race at Lowe’s Motor Speedway, many drivers in the Cup Series field were eliminated 
as their poorly-engineered tires failed under the racing conditions. 
When a professional racing series is not at a track, driving schools, which teach ordinary 
fans  how to  drive  on different  race tracks,  take their place.  For example, Fast  Track High 
Performance Driving School will offer 36 Thunder Courses at Lowe’s Motor Speedway in 2007.  
With each class holding 20 (and each class selling out), this implies over 700 people utilizing the 
track for just one type of non-competition activity.  The school will also offer 10 Classic Oval 
Courses (two-day course) and 10 Basic Oval Courses (one-day course) at the track over the same 
period of time.  Each of these classes holds between 20 and 25 students as well.  During the 
breaks in formal classes, instructors also take those not in the classes (who randomly show up as 
part of track tours) for hot laps.  These laps are at 165 mph, and are designed to give a person an 
idea of what a driver experiences during a race.  Due to their reduced length and cost, they are very popular.  Also, Fast Track is only one of eight driving schools that operate out of Lowe’s 
Motor Speedway. 
Race tracks are also used to film motion pictures about racing.  Perhaps the most notable 
of  these  motion  pictures  is  Days  of  Thunder,  which  was  filmed  at  Daytona  International 
Speedway and Lowe’s Motor Speedway.  The more recent film, Talladega Nights, was also 
filmed at Lowe’s Motor Speedway, as well as at Talladega Superspeedway and North Carolina 
Speedway.  On a smaller scale, commercials for some of the sponsors affiliated with NASCAR, 
including Chevrolet, Tylenol, and Pepsi, are filmed at the tracks. 
Additionally, year round, tourists can enter the track for tours given by the speedways.  
There is also a growing trend that has seen housing units built at some of the bigger tracks.  
These allow die-hard fans the opportunity to live at their favorite race track.   Each time an 
individual associated with a race team, racing organization (NASCAR, etc.), tire manufacturer, 
driving course, motion picture production crew, or just a tourist, comes to a race track, he or she 
will spend money in the surrounding area.  The aggregate effect of this spending contributes, 
along with the jobs created by the race track, to the local economy. 
Because the tracks are in operation year round, it is reasonable to think that they may 
have an impact similar to, or greater than, that of other sports venues that operate outside the 
season as well as during the season.  There is a broad literature on the impact of stadiums and 
arenas used for professional football, baseball, basketball and hockey.  Baade and Dye (1988, 
1990) and Baade (1996) were the first to systematically assess the impact of professional sports 
on the economy of the host community.  Coates and Humphreys (1999) expand the analysis in 
several dimensions to look at the effects on a metropolitan area’s economy of construction of 
stadiums for professional baseball, basketball, and football teams, and the coming and going of 
franchises in those sports.  They find that at the average professional baseball stadium capacity, additional real per capita income would increase by $9.40 if capacity was increased by 1,000.  
They also find that the construction of a professional basketball arena will result in a per capita 
loss of $73 for each of the next 10 years following its completion.  In the previous section on 
mega-event literature, it was shown that the economic impact of the non-racing mega-events was 
similar to that of the Daytona 500.  Should the overall impact of race tracks be similar to that of 
the  stadiums  and  arenas  of  other  professional  sports,  it  would  be  expected  that  significant 
positive benefits do not stem from their existence. 
Recently,  the  analysis  of  the  effects  of  sports  on  local  economies  has  taken  a  more 
microeconomic  tack.    Carlino  and  Coulson  (2004)  use  a  hedonic  approach  to  measure  the 
implicit price of a professional  football team  as  it is  capitalized into residential  rents.  The 
approach of this paper mirrors that analysis, except the focus is on NASCAR-sanctioned race 
tracks  and  events.    We  will  not  only  explore  the  economic  impact  of  these  tracks  on  the 
community, but will also separate that impact into that which comes from hosting the Cup, 
Grand  National,  and  Truck  Series  mega-events,  and  that  which  comes  from  the  non-race 




In  this  section,  we  describe  the  hedonic  model  of  the  rental  price  of  housing.    In  a 
hedonic  model,  the  equilibrium  price  of  a  good  is  a  function  of  the  good’s  observable 
characteristics, each of which has an implicit value.  Relating this to housing, the price of a home 
is a function of both its physical attributes, such as its age or the number of bedrooms, and its 
immediate surroundings, such as the presence of heavy traffic or garbage in the neighborhood 
streets.  In a hedonic price equation for housing, the coefficient on each characteristic (either an 
attribute or surrounding) is interpreted as the marginal value of that characteristic in equilibrium.  If a coefficient is significant, this means the presence of the associated characteristic shifts the  
demand or the supply for housing, and either increases or decreases the equilibrium price. 
The hedonic model is typically applied in two ways.  In the first way, most common in 
the environmental literature, the assumption is that proximity to an undesirable facility, such as a 
garbage dump or prison, lowers property values.  As distance from the facility rises, the effect it 
has on property values declines.  In the second way hedonic analysis is used, the characteristic 
whose value is of interest has an equal impact on all houses in the community.  For example, 
houses in communities with good schools will sell for a price premium over identical houses in 
communities  with  lower  quality  schools.    Carlino  and  Coulson  (2004)  follow  this  second 
approach to assess the social benefits to a community of hosting a professional football franchise. 
To see if an automobile race track adds local economic value, we adapt the Carlino and 
Coulson  (2004)  approach.    If  people  receive  non-pecuniary  benefits  from  the  presence  of  a 
NASCAR-sanctioned automobile race track in their locality, they express it indirectly through an 
increased demand for housing in the area.  This increased demand bids up the price of housing, 
which consequently increases rental values.  One possible non-pecuniary benefit received from 
the presence of a track is the sense of community pride stemming from the fact that people live 
in an area that is important enough to host a NASCAR event.  This effect is the same for all of 
the people living in the area, regardless of their proximity to the race track, and is something we 
attempt to measure. 
This paper will follow Carlino and Coulson (2004) by using essentially the same housing 
data,  and  many  of  the  same  control  variables.  It  will  attempt  to  measure  the  impact  of 
NASCAR-sanctioned  automobile  race  tracks  on  local  rental  values  (those  within  the  same 
SMSA),  without  controlling  for  the  type  or  quantity  of  event  held  there.    However,  unlike 
Carlino and Coulson (2004), this paper will also address the impact of the specific events.  Of course, they could not evaluate the effect of specific events because each city with an NFL 
franchise plays host to the same number of events each season.  This is not true for the tracks 
holding NASCAR events. Consequently, we estimate a model including variables indicating the 
specific type of NASCAR Series events, Cup, Grand National, or Truck, held at a track.  Note 
that a track may hold between zero and three types of these events.  Each type of event is 
allowed to have a different effect, and tests are conducted to assess whether different event types 
have different effects.  Only the results of these models are presented, but additional information 
is available upon request. 
The dependent variable in all of the models will be the natural log of deflated rent, with 
1993 as the base year.  Deflation is done using the CPI  inflation calculator available at the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics website
2.  The model is estimated  both with SMSA-specific fixed 
effects  and with  SMSA-specific time trends.    These variables are included to soak up the 
systematic variation in rents unique to the SMSA that cannot be linked to explici t variables, 
either because those variables are unobserved or because they are unobservable.  Their inclusion 
also means that the effects of  the variables of interest are identified from the SMSAs where 
tracks have opened or closed and where races have been introduced or lost.   This raises the 
possibility of reverse causation, namely that tracks and races are placed in SMSAs that have high 
(or low) rents rather than rents being high (or low) as a consequence of the track or races.  We 
will discuss this issue in more detail later. 
The general model is as follows: 
lndrentijt = ʱRjt + βHijt + ∑δjSMSAjt + ∑γj(SMSA*time)jt + εijt, 
 
where Rjt  and Hijt are racing and housing unit  characteristics, respectively,  and  ʱ and β  are 
vectors of parameters to be estimated which reflect the implicit rental prices of the racing and 
                                                 
2 The BLS CPI inflation calculator web address is http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl. housing characteristics. The δj and γj vectors of parameters are city j-specific intercepts and time 
trends to be estimated, and εijt is a random error with mean zero but whose variance differs by 
SMSA and  year.  All of the models will be clustered by  SMSAid,  a variable that uniquely 
identifies  observations  from  both  the  same  SMSA  and  year.    This  will  account  for  any 
correlation between the errors that occurs in observations from the same SMSA during a given 
year, but not between the errors in observations from other SMSAs in other years.  In other 
words, if the observation variance is assumed to be similar either among all SMSAs or among all 
years, and it is in fact, dissimilar, the standard errors of the regressions will be incorrect, and 
hypothesis tests will be unreliable.  Clustering by both SMSA and year will  allow the error 
variance to differ by both SMSA and year.  In addition, inverse probability of selection weights 
are placed on the observations to make the sample data more representative of the population. 
The  null hypotheses  are that neither the presence of an automobile race  track,  nor a 
NASCAR event (whether it be in the Cup, Grand National, or Truck Series), has a significant 
impact on rental value.  That is, all the coefficients in the vector ʱ are equal to zero.  The 
alternative hypothesis is that at least one of those coefficients is different from zero.  In each 
model with more than one racing variable of interest, the coefficients on those variables will be 
both individually and jointly tested for significance.  If the null hypothesis is rejected in any of 
these tests, this is support for the belief that NASCAR-sanctioned tracks or events significantly 




The housing unit data used (both rental values and unit-specific characteristics) comes 
from the American Housing Survey (AHS national data, as opposed to metro).  Descriptive 
statistics and variable definitions are reported in Table 1.  The duration spans 13 years, from 1993 to 2005 (inclusive), covering all 141 SMSAs identified in the AHS.  Over this time period, 
NASCAR held at least one Cup, Grand National, or Truck Series event on 52 different race 
tracks.  Unfortunately, 21 of these 52 tracks are not included in our data, as 12 are located in 
SMSAs not included in the AHS, while the other nine are not located within SMSAs at all.  
Consequently, we have just 31 of the 52 tracks accounted for in the data.  These 31 tracks only 
held  about  half  of  the  Cup,  Grand  National,  or  Truck  Series  races  over  the  sample  period.  
Specifically, our 31 tracks hosted 300 of the 598 events, broken down into 89 of 235 Cup races, 
110 of 218 Grand National races, and 101 of 145 Truck races.  It is important to note that while 
there exist numerous other series in NASCAR, these serve as driver development series, and are 
somewhat akin to the minor leagues.  Therefore, they are omitted from the study.  All of the 
event- and track-specific data comes from a variety of sources, most notably NASCAR itself, 
through its website.  Information on all 52 tracks may be seen in Tables 2 & 3.  In Table 2, the 
2005 NASCAR Series events held at each track are shown.  These events change over time, as 
some of the races in 2005 were previously held at different tracks, or not at all. 
Use  of  such  a  wide  array  of  SMSAs  clearly  means  that  many  contribute  very  few 
observations to the data.  One might, therefore, be tempted to limit analysis to larger SMSAs.  
Unfortunately, this affects the tracks and events that are included in the data.  For example, if the 
analysis is limited to SMSAs that contribute 100 or more observations, then Daytona Beach, 
Florida  and  Johnson  City-Kingsport-Bristol,  Tennessee-Virginia  would  be  omitted  from  the 
analysis.  Between them, these two SMSAs host 10 races per year, including of course, the 
premier  event  of  NASCAR,  the  Daytona  500.    In  fact,  only  eight  SMSAs  have  fewer 
observations in the data than does Daytona, and Bristol is not one of them. Given the small 
coverage of NASCAR events in the data, the decision to include all the SMSAs seemed prudent. It should be noted that some of the 21 tracks omitted from the data are recognizable even 
to those who do not follow NASCAR.  The relative popularity of some of the missing tracks, 
such as Lowe’s Motor Speedway in Concord, North Carolina, which holds the Coca-Cola 600, 
and Darlington Raceway in Darlington, South Carolina, which held the Southern 500 until 2004, 
would seem to indicate that at least some of the positive economic impact of tracks will not be 
included in the data.  This can also be seen in the fact that the majority of the Cup races, which 
are likely to generate the most economic impact, are held at tracks outside of the data. 
There are five other important aspects of the data to mention.  First, the AHS is a random 
sampling of households, but with over-sampling of some types to assure they are represented.  
Thus,  without  accounting  for  the  sampling  weights,  the  AHS  is  not  representative  of  the 
population.   As previously mentioned, observation  weights  will be used to  account for this.  
Second, the best hope of detecting an effect of a track on rental values is to focus on the smallest 
possible areas around the track.  Therefore, not included in the analysis are SMSAs for the 
Chicago,  New  York,  and  Northern  New  Jersey  areas  that  are  aggregations  of  two  or  more 
smaller SMSAs.  Third, all of the observations that are not classified as being within an SMSA 
(SMSA 9999 in the data) were also dropped.  The exact location of these observations could not 
be identified sufficiently to determine whether properties in them were or were not near a track. 
The  fourth  issue  pertaining  to  the  data  is  that  in  the  AHS,  there  are  frequently 
observations  with  no  value  recorded  for  certain  variables.
3   For example,  our  base data set 
contains 69,068 (weighted) observations, but because variables related to some observations are 
missing values, the final sample drops to the 48,433 reported in Table 1.  Certain variables, such 
as average monthly  electricity  cost  and  unit square footage, have more missing values than 
                                                 
3 Coates, Humphreys, and Zimbalist (2006) criticize Carlino and Coulson (2004) because their inclusion of the 
average monthly electricity cost in their regressions non-randomly dropped low rent-low rent growth observations 
from their analysis.  others.  Including these two variables further reduces the sample to 27,151 observations.  Values 
for six additional variables – the presence of crime, street noise, subsidized rent, rent control, 
abandoned buildings, and trash in the streets – are also frequently missing in the data.  Excluding 
these variables, as well as average monthly electricity cost and unit square footage, raises the 
sample size to 67,180.  Because observations with missing values of these variables may not be 
random,  we  estimate  the  model  including  them  all,  excluding  them  all,  and  excluding  only 
average monthly electricity cost and unit square footage, resulting in 27,151, 67,180, and 48,433 
weighted  observations,  respectively.    Indeed,  we  test  for  a  different  mean  rent  between  the 
observations included in the larger sample and those excluded by the smaller sample.
4  The tests 
reveal that in each case, the excluded observations have a statistically smaller mean rent than the 
included observations.  In other words, dropping observations based on missing values of 
average monthly electricity  cost, unit square footage, crime, street noise, subsidized rent, rent 
control,  abandoned  buildings ,  or  trash  in  the  streets,  produces  a  no n-random  sample  of 
observations.  Our estimation with the larger samples is an attempt to assess the sensitivity of the 
results to this non-randomness.
5 
Finally, many of the tracks are quite distant from the central city area of the SMSA.  For 
example, Atlanta Motor Speedway is about 25 miles from downtown Atlanta, while Chicagoland 
Speedway is in Joliet, Illinois, nearly 50 miles from downtown Chicago.  It is hard to imagine 
that tracks as distant as these have measurable impact s on rental values across the SMSA.  To 
address this issue, we estimate the model both on the full sample of observations, and separately 
on both those observations that are identified as being within the central city of the SMSA and 
                                                 
4 These tests are on the unweighted observations. 
5 The approach requires us to drop variables from the list of regressors.  To the extent that these variables determine 
rent and are correlated with the track and racing event variables, their exclusion from the regression biases the track 
and race coefficients. those  that  are  not.    This  is,  we  recognize,  a  weak  method  of  controlling  for  distance  from 
downtown.  However, actual distance does not vary across time, so it would be captured in the 
SMSA-specific effect.   Likewise, area of an SMSA does not vary over the sample period, and 
would also be captured in the fixed effect.  Consequently, to assess the importance of distance 
from the central city, we estimate the models with interaction terms involving the central city 




The results are presented in Tables 4 through 6.  These tables report the coefficients on 
the NASCAR variables under several alternative specifications of the regression equation.
6  Each 
of the three tables is for a specific subset of the data as described above.  In each table, the results 
are reported for the full sample, for both the central and non-central city sub-samples, and for the 
full sample when the model includes interactions between the NASCAR variables and the central 
city dummy.   
Table 4 shows the results for the largest regression sample, omitting those eight variables 
that are frequently missing in the data and hence constrict the sample the most.   The results in 
Tables 5 and 6, with the more restrictive samples, are consistent with those from Table 4 and are, 
therefore, not discussed separately. The results imply that the effects of the NASCAR variables 
are different on central city and non-central city housing units.  In the split samples, no track or 
race variable is significant in the central city regression, while the Truck Series race variable is in 
the non-central city regressions.  When the data are pooled and interaction terms included, three 
of the central city interactions are statistically significant , as are three of the uninteracted race 
                                                 
6 Each regression also includes SMSA-fixed effects, SMSA-specific time trends, and housing unit characteristics 
such as age, number of bedrooms, number of bathrooms, and whether the unit has central air conditioning or a 
garage.  Table 1 shows the full list of housing unit explanatory variables. variables.  A Cup Series race appears to lower non-central city rents by nearly ten percent, but to 
raise central city rents by about five percent relative to that.  However, one cannot reject the null 
that the two coefficients are equal but of opposite sign. In both the central and non-central city 
sub-samples, one cannot reject the null hypothesis that the NASCAR variables all have zero 
coefficients.  However, in the pooled sample with interactions, one can reject the null. 
Table 7 reports the p-values for joint hypothesis tests on the significance of the NASCAR 
variables for each sub-sample.  In most cases, one can reject the null of no significance of the 
track and race variables at the one percent level or better.  The cases when the null cannot be 
rejected occur when the central city interaction terms are not included in the regression, or when 
the  null  focuses  exclusively  on  the  uninteracted  track  and  event  variables.    In  other  words, 
treating  central  city  and  non-central  city  units  as  though  they  are  affected  the  same  by  the 
NASCAR variables is a mistake.   
Consider now the sizes of the effects.  To do this, we restrict attention to the pooled 
regressions with the central city interaction variables, as these specifications are supported by the 
joint hypothesis tests.   Our focus is also directed at the sample with over 67,000 observations.  
In this case, six of the eight NASCAR variables are individually significant at the five percent 
level  or  better.    The  coefficients  on  both  the  Grand  National  Series  event  variable  and  its 
interaction  term  are  each  significant  at  better  than  the  one  percent  level.    The  pattern  of 
coefficients implies that the presence of a track in an SMSA may raise rents on central city units 
about 4.7 percent, but that the specific events have no effect on central city units.  For example, 
the effect of a Grand National Series race on a central city unit is the sum of the coefficients of 
the Grand National Series event variable and its interaction term, or 0.1805 + (-0.1813) = -.0008.  
Testing that this sum is zero cannot reject the null.  Likewise, the sum of the coefficients of the  
Truck Series event variable (-0.0743) and its interaction term (0.0872) is not different from zero, nor are the sums of the coefficients of the Cup Series event variable and its interaction term, or 
those of the track variable and its interaction term.  The individual statistical significance of the 
event variables indicates that these events alter rents on non-central city residences.  Interestingly, 
Cup and Truck Series races significantly reduce rents while Grand National Series races raise 
them.  The size of these effects is substantial.  The coefficients imply percentage changes in real 
average monthly rent of -9.2, -7.2, and 19.8 percent due to Cup, Truck, and Grand National 
Series races, respectively. 
The effects of events on rents in non-central city areas are substantial and may suggest 
biased coefficient estimates.  One possibility is that the event variables are capturing the effects 
of the omitted average monthly electricity cost, unit square footage, abandoned buildings, trash 
in the streets, the presence of crime, street noise, rent control and subsidized rent variables.
7  To 
assess this possibility, we re-estimate the model including these variables, replacing the missing 
values with zero and creating dummy variables that identify the observations for which these 
replacements were done.
8  The Grand National race variable drops to 0.1146, well below the 
0.1805 value reported in Table 4 but still implying a very large impact of  Grand National races 
on non-central city rents.  The  Truck Series race  variable also drops in  (absolute) magnitude, 
from  -0.0743 to  -0.0520.  Implications of joint hypothesis tests under this new model   are 




There are two large issues with respect to the analysis here.  First, the sample does not 
include a large number of tracks and events.  Second, the question of whether our results indicate 
                                                 
7 Having a missing value for any of these variables is, for the most part, strongly correlated with one or more of the 
NASCAR variables.  In other words, the NASCAR variables will pick up some of the effects of the omitted 
variables for the observations whose values are missing.   
8 Complete results are available upon request. tracks and races cause rents or if rents induce track construction and the granting of races casts 
doubt on our results.  We take these issues in turn. 
  There is little we can do about the missing tracks and events.  Table 3 indicates that most 
of the tracks and events omitted from our data are either not included in the AHS sample or are 
unidentifiable  in  that  data.    Only  the  two  tracks  in  Portland,  Oregon,  and  Lowe’s  Motor 
Speedway outside Charlotte, North Carolina, exist in identifiable SMSAs in data collected by the 
AHS.    Unfortunately,  the  Metro  Survey  is  conducted  in  the  opposite  years  of  the  National 
Sample, which provides us with the existing observations, and is not available for each of the 
intervening years.  According to the AHS website, Charlotte and Portland are available only for 
1995 and 2002.  Lowe’s Motor Speedway hosts two each of Cup and Grand National Series 
races in each year of our sample and began hosting a Truck Series event in 2003.  Portland 
Speedway hosted a single Truck Series event in 1995 and 1997, while Portland International 
Raceway hosted one in 1999.  Neither of the Portland tracks hosted any Cup or Grand National 
Series events during our sample period, and the Portland Speedway closed at the end of the 2001 
season.  Because of the timing of the Metro Survey of the AHS, and the events in Charlotte and 
Portland, it was deemed of little use to collect the associated data. 
  Endogeneity  of  the  track  or  event  location  is  a  potentially  severe  problem  with  our 
analysis.  Of the 31 tracks in our analysis, 12 opened after 1993 and six shut down during the 
time  period.    In  our  analysis,  given  the  use  of  SMSA-fixed  effects,  the  track  coefficient  is 
identified  off  of  these  openings  and  closings.    If  the  decision  to  open  or  close  a  track  is 
influenced by local land costs and property values, then our results are suspect.  The standard 
approach  to  the  endogeneity  of  a  regressor  is  to  use  an  instrumental  variables  regressor.  
However, the long time span of our analysis and the breadth of the sample make it difficult to 
imagine what would be valid instruments.   We assess the likely severity of the bias by looking at the mean of the log of the real 
rental value before and after a track opened in those SMSAs which had a track open during our 
sample period.  The test is conducted on the full set of almost 70,000 weighted observations as 
well as on the regression samples.  The mean (unweighted) rent is higher after the track opened 
than it is before.  At the same time, the mean rent is lower where a new track has opened than it 
is where no track opened during the period of our sample.  This evidence suggests that if track 
locations are influenced by rents, it is that they are going where rents are low, not where they are 
high, which is the opposite of the reverse causation argument for the positive coefficients on the 
track  variable.    Based  on  this,  we  feel  it  is  unlikely  that  our  results  are  being  driven  by 




This paper has looked at the economic impact of NASCAR-sanctioned automobile race 
tracks on their surrounding localities.  It has added to the existing literature, which only seems to 
focus on the competition events held at the tracks.  Our basic conclusion is that tracks and events 
are jointly significant determinants of rents, especially on central city rental units.  However, the 
mere  presence  of  a  track  is  statistically  significant  and  positive  in  several  specifications, 
suggesting that the non-NASCAR event activities at a track have a significant positive economic 
impact on the area.  This impact may, however, be limited to central city areas of an SMSA, as 
the significant track variables occur almost exclusively in central city sub-samples or as central 
city-track interaction terms. 
The evidence of the effects of specific events is mixed.  In central city and non-central 
city sub-sample regressions, event variables are rarely statistically significant.  In the pooled 
sample with interaction terms, negative effects of Cup and Truck Series races on non-central city units are common.  Grand National Series races may have positive impacts on non-central city 
units.  None of the event variables has a significant effect on central city observations. 
These results  suggest  that tracks  and even specific events  are probably not  useful  as 
general tools for encouraging economic development.  This is likely to be especially true for 
tracks in more urban settings.  However, if a community outside the central city area of an 
SMSA has a track, or plans to build one, that community may want to push to host a Grand 
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 Table 1 - Weighted Descriptive Statistics 
       
Variable  Description  Mean  Std. Dev. 
       
  Auto Racing Variables of Interest     
       
cuprace*  Track hosts at least one Cup Series race during the year  0.098  0.297 
gnrace*  Track hosts at least one Grand National Series race during the year  0.131  0.337 
track*  SMSA has an operational automobile race track  0.279  0.449 
truckrace*  Track hosts at least one Truck Series race during the year  0.128  0.334 
       
  American Housing Survey Control Variables     
       
airsys*  Unit has central air conditioning  0.409  0.492 
baths  Number of full bathrooms in unit  1.172  0.442 
bedrms  Number of bedrooms in unit  1.820  0.890 
cencity*  Unit in central city of MSA  0.612  0.487 
crimea*  Neighborhood has neighborhood crime  0.219  0.414 
detone*  Structure is one-unit building, detached from all others  0.167  0.373 
eaban*  Abandoned/vandalized buildings within 1/2 block of unit  0.068  0.252 
ejunk*  Trash/junk in streets/properties within 1/2 block of unit  0.195  0.396 
garage*  Garage or carport included with unit  0.331  0.471 
halfb  Number of half bathrooms in unit  0.134  0.371 
highrise*  Unit is in a building with more than six floors  0.047  0.212 
holes*  Unit has holes in floor  0.019  0.135 
lndrent  Natural log of deflated rent  6.213  0.555 
lowrise*  Unit is in a building with less than four floors  0.813  0.390 
pubsew*  Unit connected to public sewer  0.985  0.123 
rcntrl*  Rent limited by rent control/stabilization  0.062  0.242 
strna*  Neighborhood has heavy street noise/traffic  0.306  0.461 
subrnt*  Government subsidizes rent for unit  0.019  0.137 
unitage  Age of unit (years)  41.039  23.872 
unitagesq  Age of unit squared (years)  2254.035  2288.510 
       
  Number of Observations:  48,433     
       
* Variables are dummy variables, and take on a value of 1 if the condition in the description is met, 











 Table 2 - NASCAR-Sanctioned Race Tracks Present in Data 
         
   SMSA 
2005 Series Events 
   Cup  GN  Truck 
Superspeedways (Ovals of 2 miles or more)         
         
California Speedway  Riverside-San Bernardino, CA  2  2  1 
Daytona International Speedway  Daytona Beach, FL  2  2  1 
Indianapolis Motor Speedway  Indianapolis, IN  1  0  0 
         
Intermediate Speedways (Ovals >1 mile but <2 miles)         
         
Atlanta Motor Speedway  Atlanta, GA  2  1  2 
Chicago Motor Speedway  Chicago, IL  0  0  0 
Chicagoland Speedway  Chicago, IL  1  1  0 
Gateway International Raceway  St. Louis, MO-IL  0  1  1 
Homestead-Miami Speedway  Miami-Ft. Lauderdale, FL  1  1  1 
Kansas Speedway  Kansas City, MO-KS  1  1  1 
Kentucky Speedway  Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN  0  1  1 
Las Vegas Motor Speedway  Las Vegas, NV  1  1  1 
Nashville Superspeedway  Nashville, TN  0  2  1 
Texas Motor Speedway  Fort Worth-Arlington, TX  2  2  2 
         
Short Tracks (Ovals of 1 mile or less)         
         
Bristol Motor Speedway  Johnson City-Kingsport-Bristol, TN-VA  2  2  1 
Colorado National Speedway  Boulder-Longmont, CO  0  0  0 
Evergreen Speedway  Seattle, WA  0  0  0 
Flemington Speedway  Middlesex-Somerset-Hunterdon, NJ  0  0  0 
I-70 Speedway  Kansas City, MO-KS  0  0  0 
Indianapolis / O'Reilly Raceway Park  Indianapolis, IN  0  1  1 
Memphis Motorsports Park  Memphis, TN-AR-MS  0  1  1 
Mesa Marin Raceway  Bakersfield, CA  0  0  0 
Nashville Speedway USA / Music City Motorplex  Nashville, TN  0  0  0 
Nazareth Speedway  Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA  0  0  0 
Orange County Speedway  Raleigh-Durham, NC  0  0  0 
Phoenix International Raceway  Phoenix, AZ  2  2  1 
Pike's Peak International Raceway  Colorado Springs, CO  0  1  0 
Saugus Speedway  Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA  0  0  0 
The Milwaukee Mile  Milwaukee, WI  0  1  1 
Tucson Raceway Park  Tucson, AZ  0  0  0 
Walt Disney World Speedway  Orlando, FL  0  0  0 
         
Road Courses (Require right turns)         
         





 Table 3 - NASCAR-Sanctioned Race Tracks Not Present in Data 
         
      Location     SMSA 
In Metro Survey Only         
         
Charlotte / Lowe's Motor Speedway    Concord, North Carolina    1520 
Portland International Raceway    Portland, Oregon    6440 
Portland Speedway    Portland, Oregon    6440 
         
Not Present in American Housing Survey         
         
Dover (Downs) International Speedway    Dover, Delaware    2190 
Heartland Park Topeka    Topeka, Kansas    8440 
Hickory Motor Speedway    Hickory, North Carolina    3290 
Louisville Motor Speedway    Louisville, Kentucky    4520 
Mansfield Motorsports Speedway    Mansfield, Ohio    4800 
Michigan International Speedway    Brooklyn, Michigan    3520 
Myrtle Beach Speedway    Myrtle Beach, South Carolina    5330 
New Hampshire International Speedway    Loudon, New Hampshire    4760 
Richmond International Speedway    Richmond, Virginia    6760 
         
Not Part of SMSA         
         
Autodromo Hermanos Rodriguez    Mexico City, Mexico    N/A 
Darlington Raceway    Darlington, South Carolina    N/A 
Martinsville Speedway    Martinsville, Virginia    N/A 
North Carolina (Motor) Speedway    Rockingham, North Carolina    N/A 
North Wilkesboro Speedway    North Wilkesboro, North Carolina    N/A 
Pocono Raceway    Long Pond, Pennsylvania    N/A 
(Big Daddy's) South Boston Speedway    South Boston, Virginia    N/A 
Talladega Superspeedway    Talladega, Alabama    N/A 

















 Table 4 - Regression Results:  Excluding Eight Variables 
               
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficients  t-Statistics 
      Independent 
Variables 
Coefficients  t-Statistics 
     
               
Full Sample - 67,180 Observations 
               
Without Central City Interactions      With Central City Interactions 
               
track  0.0218  0.95      track  0.0116  0.45 
          cctrack  0.0181  0.87 
               
track  -0.0154  0.54      track  -0.0271  -0.76 
cuprace  -0.0543  -1.30      cuprace  -0.0965  -1.98** 
gnrace  0.0520  1.62      gnrace  0.1805  3.90*** 
truckrace  -0.0230  -0.95      truckrace  -0.0743  -2.01** 
          cctrack  0.0460  2.07** 
          cccuprace  0.0517  1.19 
          ccgnrace  -0.1813  -4.12*** 
          cctruckrace  0.0872  2.29** 
               
               
Central City Sample      Non-Central City Sample 
42,105 Observations      25,075 Observations 
               
track  -0.0028  -0.09      track  0.0571  1.64 
               
track  -0.0086  -0.27      track  0.0465  1.08 
cuprace  -0.0774  -1.42      cuprace  -0.0225  -0.46 
gnrace  0.0345  0.94      gnrace  0.0786  1.57 
truckrace  0.0012  0.05      truckrace  -0.0591  -1.68* 
               
               
***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively 
               
The eight omitted variables include average monthly electricity cost, unit square footage, as well as crimea, eaban, 












 Table 5 - Regression Results:  Excluding Two Variables 
               
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficients  t-Statistics 
      Independent 
Variables 
Coefficients  t-Statistics 
     
               
Full Sample - 48,133 Observations 
               
Without Central City Interactions      With Central City Interactions 
               
track  0.0266  1.57      track  0.0197  1.06 
          cctrack  0.0127  1.08 
               
track  0.0322  1.85*      track  0.0237  1.17 
cuprace  -0.0116  -0.46      cuprace  -0.0662  -1.82* 
gnrace  -0.0145  -0.61      gnrace  0.0318  0.93 
truckrace  0.0075  0.55      truckrace  -0.0028  -0.17 
          cctrack  0.0062  0.45 
          cccuprace  0.0878  3.12*** 
          ccgnrace  -0.0678  -2.67*** 
          cctruckrace  0.0180  1.23 
               
               
Central City Sample      Non-Central City Sample 
29,351 Observations      19,082 Observations 
               
track  0.0513  2.98***      track  0.0007  0.02 
               
track  0.0410  2.29**      track  0.0299  1.31 
cuprace  -0.0367  -1.51      cuprace  0.0176  0.38 
gnrace  -0.0066  -0.26      gnrace  -0.0244  -0.61 
truckrace  0.0324  2.16**      truckrace  -0.0278  -1.55 
               
               
***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively 
               













 Table 6 - Regression Results:  Including All Variables 
               
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficients  t-Statistics 
      Independent 
Variables 
Coefficients  t-Statistics 
     
               
Full Sample - 27,151 Observations 
               
Without Central City Interactions      With Central City Interactions 
               
track  0.0175  0.53      track  0.0180  0.50 
          cctrack  -0.0010  -0.07 
               
track  0.0350  1.17      track  0.0477  1.53 
cuprace  -0.0779  -1.78*      cuprace  -0.1562  -2.75*** 
gnrace  0.0249  0.72      gnrace  0.0640  1.21 
truckrace  -0.0156  -0.97      truckrace  -0.0220  -0.99 
          cctrack  -0.0288  -2.06** 
          cccuprace  0.1250  3.17*** 
          ccgnrace  -0.0538  -1.33 
          cctruckrace  0.0121  0.54 
               
               
Central City Sample      Non-Central City Sample 
15,899 Observations      11,252 Observations 
               
track  0.0664  2.18**      track  -0.0313  -0.58 
               
track  0.0635  1.99**      track  0.0292  0.74 
cuprace  -0.0742  -1.54      cuprace  -0.0592  -0.71 
gnrace  0.0462  1.26      gnrace  -0.0249  -0.34 
truckrace  -0.0019  -0.11      truckrace  -0.0417  -1.75* 
               
               















 Table 7 - Joint Hypothesis Tests of Variable Significance 
     
Null Hypothesis  p-Value  Result 
     
Sample - 67,180 Observations 
     
Without Central City Interactions     
     
track = cuprace = gnrace = truckrace = 0  0.2261  Cannot Reject 
     
With Central City Interactions     
     
track = cuprace = gnrace = truckrace = 0  0.0014  Reject 
cctrack = cccuprace = ccgnrace = cctruckrace = 0  0.0008  Reject 
track = cup = gn = truck = cctrack = cccup = ccgn = cctruck = 0  0.0021  Reject 
     
     
Sample - 48,433 Observations 
     
Without Central City Interactions     
     
track = cuprace = gnrace = truckrace = 0  0.2418  Cannot Reject 
     
With Central City Interactions     
     
track = cuprace = gnrace = truckrace = 0  0.1938  Cannot Reject 
cctrack = cccuprace = ccgnrace = cctruckrace = 0  0.0023  Reject 
track = cup = gn = truck = cctrack = cccup = ccgn = cctruck = 0  0.0049  Reject 
     
     
Sample - 27,151 Observations 
     
Without Central City Interactions     
     
track = cuprace = gnrace = truckrace = 0  0.2183  Cannot Reject 
     
With Central City Interactions     
     
track = cuprace = gnrace = truckrace = 0  0.0262  Reject 
cctrack = cccuprace = ccgnrace = cctruckrace = 0  0.0003  Reject 
track = cup = gn = truck = cctrack = cccup = ccgn = cctruck = 0  0.0033  Reject 
 